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Summary 
The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis is one of the most debated 
economic issues. Despite its fascinating appeal for any policy maker, neither theoretical 
nor certain empirical evidence has been found to clean up all doubt. The aim of this 
paper is to present an economy where environmental quality and polluting emissions do 
enter the maximisation problem, and provide a transitional dynamics analysis to pursue 
a new different version of the EKC, depending on the level of development finally 
achieved. 
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A key problem environmental economists are always concerned with is to
determine whether pollution loads do necessarily decrease as nations develop,
and societies demand that more attention be paid to environmental issues.
The bulk of literature on this ￿eld has attempted to ￿nd an empirical
justi￿cation to this thesis by means of the so-called ￿Environmental Kuznets
Curve￿ (EKC, henceforth).1 Although this intriguing hypothesis has im-
mediately had great success amongst researchers and policy-makers, many
authors still seriously doubt on the evidence in favour of it.
The EKC is a hypothetical relationship between some measures of envi-
ronmental degradation and per capita income. In the ￿rst stages of economic
growth, degradation and pollution are supposed to increase, but beyond some
turning-point level of income, to be determined for each environmental indi-
cator, this trend reverses, such that economic growth might lead to environ-
mental improvement, and depict the so-common inverted U-shaped function.
Basically, the EKC concept ￿rst emerged in the early 1990s with Gross-
man and Krueger￿ s (1991) seminal study, which encouraged folks of econo-
mists and policy-makers not to take so serious consideration of the recurrent
alarmist environmental cries, as future development would necessarily ￿clear￿
the problem afterwards. In this light, the EKC has been always seen as an
essentially empirical phenomenon to deal with, despite the need of a robust
1The EKC is so named after the Nobel Prize economist Simon Kuznets (1955) who
￿rst argumented that income inequality ￿rst rises and then falls as economies develop.
2theoretical support cannot be ignored.
Moreover, empirical evidence has never shown that the EKC hypothesis
can be applied to all pollutants, thus forcing recent contributions to consider
the theory itself somewhat doubtful. For example, river-basins￿quality un-
ambiguously worsen with increasing income, or rather both concentration of
municipal waste and carbon dioxide emissions tend to increase when income
rises (see, for example, Perman and Stern, 2003; Day and Grafton, 2003).2
The problem is that, as countries develop, they never become completely
clean, despite more stringent environmental regulations might be adopted.
In fact, as the older pollutants are cleaned up, new ones emerge, such that
the environmental impact as a whole is not reduced. And even when an
inverted U-shaped curve is empirically observed, the quarrel turns on the
turning-point income level at which the concentration of pollutants starts
decreasing.
As a matter of fact, the new EKC scenario does not reject the inverted
U-shaped curve at all, but does ￿nd evidence of an N-shaped curve instead
for some indicators, such that as income grows environmental degradation
increases in a ￿rst stage, then decreases, and ￿nally rises again (see, for
example, Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Sha￿k, 1994; Grossman, 1995). In
this light, the inverted-U function does simply represent the ￿rst stage of a
more complex behaviour.
2Lopez (1994) points out that in the EKC studies local pollutants are more likely to
display an inverted U-shape relation with income, while global impacts such as carbon
dioxide emissions do not.
3It is then commonly assumed nowadays that the classic EKC hypothe-
sis is neither theoretically nor empirically adequate to model the existence
of a relationship between pollution and per capita income (see, for exam-
ple, Copeland-Taylor, 2004). In other words, the new economic literature is
moving beyond the usual EKC.
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical support to a new version
of the EKC hypothesis to better explain why may economic systems still per-
form di⁄erently when environmental concerns are taken into account. To do
so, we consider an economy populated by in￿nitely-lived agents of two types:
families of consumers and producing ￿rms. The former are supposed to care
about the environment they live in, though the latter do not. We assume
also that households own both physical and human capital they provide to
the producing sector, and are always willing to pay something to overcome
a potential loss in environmental quality. On the contrary, ￿rms aim only at
producing ￿nal output, despite the damages and consequences could possibly
arise therefrom.
What does really matter for converging to optimality is the di⁄erent per-
ception of pollution amongst agents. In other words, public intervention
equalises the ￿rms￿welfare loss to the families welfare gains due to polluting
emissions. Or better, the former are paying a tax directly to the latter to
compensate for any harmful emitted pollutant. We are saying that the gov-
ernment ￿xes a tax h on current emissions, and families do receive the entire
revenue. The same as if we assign to families the property rights on some
4pollution permits that ￿rms have to buy to pollute ￿legally￿ . Of course, ac-
cording to the Coase theorem this immediately leads to the optimal e¢ cient
allocation of resources, since no one has an incentive to ￿free ride￿anymore.
To this end, we formalise the problem and organise the rest of the paper
as follows. In section 2, we analyse a centralised economy, and derive the
growth rate of a system where the social planner (representative household)
intervenes to maximise the welfare in a let us say ￿sustainable￿way. In sec-
tion 3, we concentrate instead on the transitional dynamics of this economy
around the steady state, and give a possible interpretation of our ￿ndings in
the light of the literature concerning the EKC hypothesis. The ￿nal section
concludes, and a subsequent Appendix provides all the necessary proofs.
2 The maximisation problem
Let us consider a centralised economy where the representative household








3The utility function we are going to deal with possesses the useful property of unitarian
green preferences. To this end, if we de￿ne ￿(C;E) as the relative preference for the
environment, or rather the ratio of the values of environmental quality and consumption,





(see, Ayong Le Kama-Schubert, 2004).
5where both consumption, C, and environmental quality, E, do enter the
utility function as two substitute goods;4 subject to the following constraints
on physical capital (K),
_ K = rK + hP ￿ C (1)
and environmental quality (E),
_ E = ￿E ￿ P (2)
The budget constraint in Eq. (1) assumes that households own the entire
amount of capital K in the economy, being r the gain from renting it to
producing ￿rms, and consume a number of goods named C.5 Moreover, they
receive the tax (h) being paid by all producing ￿rms on each unit of emitted
pollution (P), as a compensation for any damage being caused to the quality
of the environment they live in.6 On the other hand, following Musu (1995),






and consequently, ￿ > 1.
5To simplify the analysis, we assume hereafter capital K to be the only producing
input, as commonly found in the so-called AK-model literature.
6Obviously, since pollution and environmental quality are seen as external by ￿rms and
households, market failures arise thus driving a wedge between the optimal and the decen-
tralised growth paths of the economy. As no incentives to invest in pollution abatement
or prevention arise, governmental intervention is called for to induce ￿rms and households
to make less extractive use of the environment, and maximise the social welfare by in-
ternalising the externality due to polluting emissions. That is to say, if ￿rms act in an
unregulated production market, and there is no ￿xed limit to polluting emissions, they feel
6we constrain environmental quality to improve over time, @ _ E
@E = ￿ > 0, being
￿ the speed at which nature regenerates, and to decay as pollution loads (P)
increase, @ _ E
@P = ￿1 < 0, as in Eq. (2).






+ ￿[rK + hP ￿ C] + ￿[￿E ￿ P]
which is linear in P. This implies that the problem could not be well de-
￿ned without imposing an upper bound of P, ￿ P, which possibly depends on
K, ￿ P = ￿ P(K). Therefore, given gx = _ x=x for a function of time x(t), the
Maximum Principle suggests the following
Proposition 1 A sustainable steady state solution requires
C(t) = "E(t); " = h(r ￿ ￿) > 0
to hold on every interior optimal path.
Proof. See the Appendix
Basically, along a sustainable balanced growth path the economy evolves
free to produce (and, conversely, to pollute) as far as economic growth is possible. On the
contrary, a public intervention ￿xing a tax on each polluting emission being realised, may
slow down any dirty production activities, and drive the system back along the socially
optimal balanced growth path.
7according to




that is, any increase in consumption is allowed only if environmental quality
does grow accordingly. But this constrain pollution P to the same growth
rate, as if we allow polluting emissions to raise only when compensated by
a proportional environmental improvement due, for example, to a recycling
programme,




= ￿; ￿ > 0 (constant) (5)
where, for simplicity, we assume hereafter ￿ = ￿ ￿
r￿￿
2￿￿1.
Remark 2 A weak sustainability rule of thumb allows environmental quality
to grow constantly over time.
The assumption of weak sustainability permits to overcome the envi-
ronmental constraints, by considering Nature as part of the total amount of
capital, which is ￿nally held constant.7 Both natural and physical capital are
therefore seen as substitutable, thanks to technological progress that allows
agents to extract more and more value from a declining amount of natural
resources.
7￿Weak sustainability requires that the amount of natural capital necessary for the
life-supporting system of the Earth is non-decreasing, and the sum of man-made and
non-critical natural capital is constant,￿(Pearce and Turner, 1990).
8On the other hand, neither we underestimate the limits nor we neglect the
biophysical laws that characterise the use of a natural resource.8 Notwith-
standing, we justify the assumption given so far about sustainability, as en-
vironmental quality is supposed to constantly improve over time (gE > 0).
In fact, although a technological sector is left out from our analysis, it is
not di¢ cult to think of it as an economy where new technologically clean
products to preserve the environment are continuously introduced whether
new pollutants may on the contrary emerge (see also Musu, 1995).
The problem we have been dealing with so far has shown the way a
social planner has to follow to determine the optimal allocation of pollution
and make a sustainable growth consequently feasible, given a constraint on
environmental quality and physical capital. However, a deepen investigation
on the evolution of this economy in the neighbourhood of the steady state
needs to be conducted. We dedicate the next section to this end.
3 Equilibrium dynamics along the BGP
Perturbing a system to check for the behaviour of its solution when approach-
ing the steady state can be noteworthy, and might help the policy maker to
better understand the appropriate decisions that drive the system towards
the long run equilibrium. The analysis conducted so far in section 2 allows
8Above all, the second law of thermodynamics states that every system always tends
to move from order to disorder, and its energy tends to be progressively transformed into
lower levels of availability, until no more availability for further processes is reached
9us to rewrite the problem in a more suitable fashion, and consequently derive
the following
Proposition 3 The motion generated by a sustainable decentralised solu-
tion implies the following two-dimensional system of ￿rst-order di⁄erential
equations:







_ P = (￿ ￿ ￿)P
given constancy of environmental quality￿ s growth rate, gE. The system pos-
sesses an unstable interior steady-state.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Our scope is to ￿nally interpret our ￿ndings in the light of the EKC liter-
ature, and eventually determine the way polluting emissions react at changes
in physical capital. To this end, we shall adopt the following convenient vari-
able substitution, x = P















10Graphic representation of Eq. (6) is more direct and straightforward, and
yields the following Figure 19
x &




Figure 1: Dynamics of the system
To summarise, a dynamic behavioural analysis permits to understand the
appropriate policy intervention that should be made to attain the steady-
state, given the initial level of our state-like and control-like variables. More-
over, thorough analysis of equilibrium coordinates provides some interesting
￿ndings. To begin with, we may consider an economy which starts up at point
A with endowment x1. This resembles the case of a clean society starting
with a high natural regeneration rate (i.e., low level of pollution), gradually
changing its production processes to abate the associated polluting emissions.
9Note that _ x can be interpreted as the speed at which the pollution to capital share
evolves over time.
11The system does ￿nally converge to O, with pollution being ￿nally weeded
out. Conversely, if we consider a dirty economy with a very high pollution
to capital share, starting, for example, at point B with endowment x2, the
system approaches equilibrium from the right-hand side, passing through E,
and constantly reducing the amount of polluting emissions, until the system
collapses again to O. Finally, it seems that an economy will ￿naturally￿con-
verge to the virgin state of nature. Nevertheless, the speed at which a society
decides to change its production processes, and reduce pollution loads, might
be slightly di⁄erent. Whereas the rich economy in B starts decreasing its pol-
lution at a very high speed, once a minimum threshold is reached, it becomes
more di¢ cult to get rid of a dirty production process, and convergence to
the stable virgin state O starts lessening.
It is also easy to interpret these ￿ndings according to the classic EKC
(Environmental Kuznets Curve) hypothesis, that associates increasing pol-
lution with increasing levels of income at a starting phase of development,
though pollution is assumed to slow down instead when a turning point is
reached at some high levels of national income.
In our case, nonetheless, a starting point at B resembles the assumption
of high income societies that are more devoted to environmental concerns,
and start reducing their emission levels. It can basically depict a situation
where polluting emissions are very high. Then, the engine of development
and growth either increases the amount of physical capital available to the
economy or progressively abates polluting emissions, thus reducing the pollu-
12tion/capital share, and thus ￿nally drive the system towards the equilibrium
point, E.
Unfortunately, equilibrium E is not stable, that is either the system lies on
it from the beginning, or it is unavoidably pushed back to the stable solution
in O. It seems then theoretically plausible that the EKC hypothesis fails at
representing a sustainable economic development as depicted in this paper.
Indeed, we can expect that whenever a society has reached a sustained level
of development, and its citizens beg for more environmental care policies, it
might very well happen that they continue to ask for a reduction of polluting
emissions, until the system collapses to the stable solution, where pollution
de￿nitely disappears.
4 Concluding remarks
Nowadays pollution is still considered a dirty word. The main question is
whether continued environmental degradation might be considered a neces-
sary part of the process of industrialisation. In other words, we ought to
investigate whether or not polluting emissions do continue to increase with-
out bound as more and more countries develop. The problem is that a clear
relationship between growth and environmental quality is particularly com-
plex: some indicators appear to improve with growth; others worsen; still
others exhibit a somewhat doubtful trend.
Basically, the concern that environmental issues may limit current growth
13opportunities is not new. The problem of sustainable development was ￿rstly
debated during the 1970s, but strongly fostered during the last decade. This
is probably due to the recent political quarrels on climate change and the
Kyoto Protocol e⁄ectiveness, but also to the emergence of a vast literature on
the so-called ￿Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis￿(EKC), where the
relationship between pollution and income is assumed to have the shape of an
inverted U, that is pollution might increase only in the ￿rst stage of economic
development, while it necessarily decreases when developed societies seek a
less polluted environment to live in, and become more willing to invest in
new technologies that clean-up the production processes of their economic
activities. Unfortunately, lots of criticisms have been raised against this
theory, since polluting problems seem to be nowadays an unavoidable burden
that developed societies have to deal with.
It seems from our analysis that behaving sustainably is not a concept that
economists might easily agree upon, as we noticed instead that a sustainable
steady state outcome mainly represents a knife-edge solution to be achieved
when the economy collapses, and Nature goes back to its Virgin state. Basi-
cally, we are assuming that whenever a sustainable policy be implemented to
allow polluting emissions grow at the same rate of consumption, this might
cause an awkward e⁄ect that might drive the system back to a situation where
solutions annihilate. On the contrary, a positive solution may be achieved,
but only if the economy starts from the beginning, and stays forever, with
endowment x2.
14To summarise, this paper has presented an economy where environmental
concerns a⁄ecting the welfare of future generations enter the decision making
problem of a green social planner. To this end, some interesting results arise
when studying the transitional dynamics of this economy. In fact, the type of
equilibrium that characterises our economy allows us to give a new contribu-
tion to the still controversial EKC hypothesis. It seems to be con￿rmed that,
as nations or regions experience greater prosperity, their citizens demand that
more attention be paid to the noneconomic aspects of their living conditions.
The richer countries which tend to have relatively cleaner urban air and river
basins, also have relatively more tightening environmental standards and
stricter enforcement of their environmental laws than the middle-income and
poorer countries, many of which still have pressing environmental problems
to address. However, instead of a possible downward sloping and inverted
U-shaped pattern, we noticed that as countries develop, they always cease
to produce certain pollution-intensive goods, no matter their starting level
of development. Nevertheless, it might very well happen that the speed at
which rich societies start changing the composition of pollutants in their
production processes be higher than the pace less developed economies do
experiment when moving towards a sustainable solution.
15A Appendix





+ ￿[rK + hP ￿ C] + ￿[￿E ￿ P]
and assuming that gx = _ x=x for a function of time x(t), and UC = @U=@C,
the Maximum Principle suggests
@HC
@C
= UC ￿ ￿ = 0 =) (1 ￿ ￿)gE ￿ ￿gC = g￿ (A.1)
@HC
@P
= ￿h ￿ ￿ = 0 =) g￿ = g￿ (A.2)
_ ￿ = ￿
@HC
@K
+ ￿￿ = ￿￿r + ￿￿ =) g￿ = ￿ ￿ r < 0 (A.3)
_ ￿ = ￿
@HC
@E








= (1 ￿ ￿)gC ￿ ￿gE (A.5)
From (A.1), (A.2) and (A.5),
(1 ￿ ￿)gE ￿ ￿gC = (1 ￿ ￿)gC ￿ ￿gE =) gC = gE (A.6)
16and thus,




from (A.1) and (A.3). Also, we have
C
￿(t) = "E
￿(t); " > 0 (constant), (A.8)
on an interior optimal path. Since UE=UC = C=E = ", (A.4) yields
g￿ = (￿ ￿ ￿) ￿
UE
￿
= g￿ = (￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ "
￿
￿




From (A.9), (A.2) and (A.3), it follows that
" = h(r ￿ ￿) (A.10)
Note that constant gE implies







for gE = ￿ ￿ P=E. The initial values C0 and P0 are ￿nally obtained as







Finally, (A.8) is obtained without any assumption of BGP, and thus holds
on every interior optimal path. In fact, since " is constant not only on an
17optimal BGP, but also on any interior optimal path, one cannot perturb the
system by varying " for a local analysis around the steady state.
In any case, nonnegativity conditions impose some restrictions on the
parameters:
r > ￿ for C > 0 (A.13)
and
￿(2￿ ￿ 1) + ￿ > r for P > 0 (A.14)
As another restriction, the objective functional is well de￿ned i⁄2gE(1￿￿)￿
￿ < 0. Or, equivalently,
￿ > 2(1 ￿ ￿)r. (A.15)
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